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6

More on the New Reformism

- J. E. CHIARADIA
- E. HOFSTEN
- THE EDITORS

The Lebanese Impasse

MAHMOUD HUSSEIN

The New Mao Literature: A Review

BEN STAVIS

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

We mourn the deaths of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Karpen Moffitt, stalwarts of the struggle against fascism and for a better world, assassinated in cold blood by the hired killers of the Chilean *gorilla* junta. We counted both as warm personal friends and highly valued political comrades. As always, the best tribute all of us can pay to those who fall in the struggle is to re-dedicate ourselves to the cause they believed in and served.

For a reason which will interest MR readers, our friendship with Orlando Letelier goes back twleve years, to Salvador Allende's 1964 campaign for the Chilean presidency. Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy had visited Chile in the winter of 1963 (see "Notes on Latin America," MR, March 1963), establishing cordial relations with members of the Chilean left, including Allende who was then a Senator. In the following year's presidential campaign, one of the charges leveled against Allende was his alleged anti-Americanism. In seeking to counter this accusation without

(*Continued on inside back cover*)

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MORE ON THE NEW REFORMISM

I. By John E. Chiaradia

If I understood the June Review of the Month, "The New Reformism," the gist of your argument runs as follows:

(1) Important socialist movements emerged in Europe during the closing decades of the nineteenth century, with the lead taken by the German party. Mostly these movements were absorbed into capitalist society, and when the First World War arrived socialist majorities (more specifically, the socialist center, since the right wing had abjured revolution and Marxism even before 1914) openly broke with revolutionary Marxism, thus isolating smaller groups on the left. If the SPD was the principal example of the change, the most significant exception was the Bolshevik movement led by Lenin.

(2) You seem to suggest that something similar occurred with the Western Communist movement gathered under the Third International. Actually, your analysis appears to indicate

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two causes for the new reformism, although neither is well developed. The first may be labeled ideological-political: even before the Second World War the Communist movement suffered from an inability to cope with or understand the problems of the period, a disastrous situation with fascism on the offensive. The second is sociological: given the long period of economic growth and relative political stability following the war, the Communist movements succumbed, were absorbed, and hence the new reformism.

Two puzzling footnotes appear in the text. One refers to Spain and Portugal as "the last two remaining fascist dictatorships." Do you mean today, 1976? In the other, Togliatti is quoted as saying that the Italian working class is/was not revolutionary, thereby creating (I suppose) an insuperable dilemma for a Marxist leadership. Oddly, I thought Togliatti had been answered half a century before by Lenin. I quote from a letter Lenin wrote to Boris Souvarine which appeared in *Avanti!* of January 3, 1918:

> Because the minority really represented the interests of the masses; because it had faith in the coming revolution; because it was ready to act with courage. Numerical weakness? But when did revolutionaries hinge their policies on the fact that they were a minority within a majority? When our party in November 1914 proclaimed the need to divide ourselves from the opportunists, declaring that such a schism was the only dignified answer to the betrayal of August 1914, to many this declaration seemed the sectarian extravagance of a group having lost all touch with reality.

If I have summarized correctly, there is room to register dissent with the presentation in point (2). It seems to me that the present reformism can be traced back to changes taking place in the Communist movement in the middle 1920s. The concomitant of "socialism in one country," and the subsequent "Bolshevization" of the International, was an international movement whose revolutionary commitment became increasingly verbal, and whose tactical freedom was limited to the needs of the Soviet leadership. A case in point is the Italian Communist party, which in the early years was probably the

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best in the West. The subversion and transformation of that party through the offices of the International were completed by 1926 at the famous III Congress [of the Italian Communist party] of Lyons. The changes were both ideological and political, with new personnel occupying key positions. As class revolution and internationalism went out, socialism was (again) redefined as state capitalism (realized in the USSR in the 1930s and postwar) and then as reformism (the situation today). In other words, there was no break between one and the other. The same men, the same situations, the same structures readjusted to meet a changing set of conditions. Therefore, rather than argue that capitalist successes reduced Communist revolution to verbalism, I would stress that Communist tactics contributed to the neocapitalist surge of the postwar. The year 1945 was one of working-class defeats, for they emerged from the war without any perspective of class action other than that of junior and work partner in reconstruction coalitions. Analogously, can one imagine an October Revolution if Lenin and the Bolsheviks had waited to seize power until a victorious Allied camp had forced Germany to an armistice? The present reformism has a longer history than your comments would indicate.

I would agree with your conclusion that we need new revolutionary Marxist movements in the West, and with that a new history of the past half century. A good starting point might be the Seventh Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International of October 1926. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev (some for the last time, I believe), as well as Stalin, Bukharin, and others spoke on the question of what an isolated workers' state should do when faced with protracted delay of revolution in the West.

Incidentally, there is a literature in Italy on Togliatti's *doppia linea,* when he ran with the revolutionary hares and hunted with the reformist hounds. The term is used to designate the policies followed by Togliatti between his return to Italy in 1944 and 1948, and his ability to keep militant sections of the working class convinced that he stood for the very revolution he eschewed as leader of the party and member of the Italian government. He was not so ingenuous as implied in the interview with Baran.

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II. By Erland Hofsten

I would like to make some comments on the Review of the Month on "The New Reformism."

Your arguments explaining why the CPs of Western Europe are developing—must develop?—in a reformist direction are very convincing, and have opened my eyes in a number of respects. However, what I would like to say is that your discussion should be supplemented by a discussion about the possibility of the emergence of a revolutionary situation.

I think everybody agrees that unless a revolutionary situation has arisen, a revolution cannot be carried out. Marx and Engels believed that such a situation would emerge fairly soon in the industrialized countries and looked very much at France in 1871. This has, however, not come true. Che Guevara demonstrated what happens if you make an attempt in a country where the conditions are lacking.

Capitalism functions very badly everywhere, but at least in Europe not badly enough for a revolutionary situation to be created, not yet anyway. Thanks to lucky circumstances and Social Democratic support, capitalism has worked fairly well in the postwar period in Scandinavia. In Italy it has worked badly, but not badly enough to create a revolutionary situation.

But we know that the situation may change very rapidly. Nobody expected what happened in France in 1968 and nevertheless it occurred. Well, it was far from a revolution on that occasion, but the example is relevant all the same.

The question one should ask now is what things may happen in the future which may lead to a revolutionary situation in one or some of the countries of Western Europe.

A war may obviously lead to revolution—this is what the Chinese have said on a number of occasions. But otherwise? Well, inner contradictions of the system *by themselves* do not look as if they are strong enough to bring about a revolutionary situation. But perhaps after all they may. This is where

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environment, pollution, etc., come in and are so important. In order to work, capitalism must permanently expand, and it can only do so by spoiling the environment, causing severe pollution, etc. This may become more and more important, and in addition people will become more and more aware of the severity of the problems created.

Furthermore, as a second factor, a common action by the poor countries may have consequences for the industrialized countries. These consequences could become very grave and could very well lead to the rapid emergence of a revolutionary situation. Look at what happened in 1973 as a consequence of the oil crisis.

At the end of your article you speak about the "difficult, urgent, and no doubt very lengthy task of reconstituting revolutionary Marxism on a solid foundation." Yes, but in order to do so, it is necessary to discuss in great detail the kind of problems which I have outlined above.

The points of view which I have discussed are no doubt familiar to you, but I could not resist the temptation to write a letter. From my own experience I know very well that all writers appreciate having reactions from their readers. And it was good to have this opportunity to keep in touch with you.

THE EDITORS COMMENT

John Chiaradia refers to two "puzzling" footnotes in the June Review of the Month. One cites Spain and Portugal as Europe's "last two remaining fascist dictatorships," and Chiaradia asks if we "mean today, 1976." We thought the context made it clear that we were talking about the European situation after the Second World War, during most of which Spain and Portugal were certainly fascist dictatorships, and not about the changes that have occurred in those countries in the last two years. If this was not clear, we apologize.

In the other footnote, according to Chiaradia, "Togliatti is quoted as saying that the Italian working class is/was not revolutionary, thereby creating . . . an insuperable dilemma for a Marxist leadership." This is not quite accurate. We did

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not quote Togliatti as saying the Italian working class was not revolutionary, nor (as far as we can remember) did Baran state or imply that Togliatti told him that. The question Togliatti put to Baran was what would he, Baran, a Marxist revolutionary, advocate if he were a leader of a *mass* party of the working class in a non-revolutionary period, i.e., a period free of actual or threatened revolutionary situations? It was to this question, however Togliatti may have worded it, that Baran admitted he had no satisfactory answer. Chiaradia thinks Lenin had the answer a half century earlier. But was it really an answer to the same question? The year 1919 was one in which it was reasonable to expect—and Lenin certainly did expect—a revolutionary showdown in the near future. But this was very far from being the case in the early 1960s when Baran talked with Togliatti. Lenin might still have said that revolutionaries should break with the reformists even if it meant splitting the party and accepting a minority role, if necessary for a long time to come. That may even have been what Baran thought Togliatti should do, but from Togliatti's point of view it obviously would not have been a satisfactory answer. He wanted Baran to imagine himself in his (Togliatti's) shoes and then tell him what he (Baran) would have advocated. That Baran had no satisfactory answer was surely not to his discredit. The issues involved are too difficult and complicated. And that is after all why the whole problem is coming up for intensive reconsideration in the historical circumstances of the 1970s.

For the rest, we certainly agree with Chiaradia that present-day reformism has a longer (and more complicated) history than our comments would indicate. The subject deserves a great deal more study than it has generally received, especially from younger radicals whose experience is limited to recent years and who need to know much more about the mistakes and defeats of the past if they are to avoid repeating them. A good place to begin, we believe, is with Fernando Claudín's two-volume *The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform,* published earlier this year by Monthly Review Press.

Erland Hofsten raises an entirely different issue which we agree needs to be thoroughly pondered and discussed, namely,

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the possibility and implications of the emergence of revolutionary situations. But before entering into this subject, we must dissent from his statement that "everybody agrees that unless a revolutionary situation has arisen, a revolution cannot be carried out." On the contrary, it is of the essence of reformist doctrine, as most clearly and explicitly formulated by the Fabians in England and Bernstein in Germany toward the end of the nineteenth century,* that a socialist revolution can and should be the ultimate by-product of a long series of piecemeal reforms and not of any cataclysmic political happenings. This position rests, explicitly or implicitly, on one or both of two assumptions: Either (1) capitalism can develop relatively smoothly and without major crises or disturbances; or (2) such crises or disturbances, should they threaten or actually occur, can be contained with the help of the reformists, thus keeping open the road to a peaceful transition. Inherent in the reformist position is thus the idea that since capitalism can be peacefully transformed, it is in everyone's interest to keep it functioning satisfactorily until it can be replaced by something better. This kind of thinking, clearly, is the very opposite of that implied in Hofsten's statement that "unless a revolutionary situation has arisen, a revolution cannot be carried out."

In a very real sense, then, reformism has no place for a theory of revolutionary situations. The reformists want simply to banish the whole problem from the realm of discourse, on the underlying premise that if capitalism is to be reformed into socialism its lasting power has to be guaranteed. This very basic characteristic of reformist thinking as well as its counter-revolutionary implications have never been more clearly recog-

* English reformism and German reformism were actually so intimately related as to form parts of a single movement. During the 1880s when the Social Democratic Party was outlawed in Germany, Bernstein spent several years in London where he was closely associated with the Fabians. It was after Engels' death (1895) that he launched the revisionist movement which was really more a repudiation than a revision of Marxism. E. R. Pease, the historian of the Fabian Society, was quite justified in writing, "In England, and in Germany through Bernstein, I think the Fabian Society may claim to have led the revolt [against Marxism]." *The History of the Fabian Society* (London, 1916), p. 239.

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nized than by Marx and Engels themselves in the earliest stages of the reformist penetration of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). After the party was outlawed by Bismarck in 1878, many of its activities had to be reorganized abroad. Among other proposals was one to establish an official organ in Switzerland under an editor supervised by a three-man commission. In a circular letter to the party leadership, dated September 17/18, 1879, Marx and Engels subjected this project to a scathing critique. In the following passage from the Circular Letter, they summarize and emphatically reject the views of the three persons who would make up the controlling commission:

In sum, the working class on its own is incapable of liberating itself. To this end it has to place itself under the leadership of "educated and propertied" members of the bourgeoisie who are the only ones with the "opportunity and time" to gain an understanding of what is good for the workers. Moreover, it is absolutely wrong to struggle against the bourgeoisie, what is needed being, rather, energetic propaganda—*to win it over.*

But if one wants to win over the upper stratum of society, or even only its well-meaning elements, one must under no circumstances frighten them. And here the three Zurichers [members-to-be of the commission] believe they have made a comforting discovery:

"Under pressure of the Socialist Law [outlawing the Social Democratic party] the party has now demonstrated that it *does not want* to travel the road of violent, bloody revolution, but is determined . . . to proceed along the road of legality, i.e., of *reform.*"

In other words, if 500,000-600,000 Social Democratic voters (1/10 to 1/8 of the total electorate) spread over the whole country are so sensible as not to bash their heads against the wall and not to attempt a bloody revolution at adverse odds of ten to one, it is supposed to prove that they are *renouncing* for all future any effort to take advantage of a violent external event, of a sudden revolutionary upsurge which might result from it, yes even of a *victory* for the people gained in the ensuing collision! If Berlin should be so uncivilized as to stage another March 18th [high point of the abortive bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1848-1849], the Social Democrats, rather than joining the battle as a "barricade-loving rabble," should take the road of legality, remove the barricades, and perforce march along with the glorious army against the narrow-minded, raw, untutored masses. Or if the gentle-

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men claim that this is not what they meant, then what did they mean?*

What Marx and Engels here describe as an "external event" (*auswärtiges Ereignis*) capable of triggering a revolutionary upsurge and a possible victory for the people, i.e., of suddenly changing all the givens of the political situation in favor of the socialist forces, is evidently very close to what Erland Hofsten means by a revolutionary situation. In their day Marx and Engels saw quite clearly that incipient reformism not only did not choose to deal openly with such a possibility but by implication assigned to the party the role of helping to contain and overcome it. How is it in our day with the new reformism pioneered by the Italian and French Communist parties?

Fortunately, we do not have to speculate about the answer. Hofsten may be right that May 1968 in France was "far from a revolution," but from the point of view of the normal political process it was certainly an "external event" which had an enormously powerful immediate impact and, very possibly, the potential to effect a profound transformation in the French political scene. From what Marx and Engels wrote to the German party leadership in the Circular Letter, it is not hard to imagine how they would have reacted to such a sudden and unexpected development—with enthusiasm, optimism, confidence that the class struggle had reached a new turning point. No more than in the case of the Paris Commune would they have asked for guarantees of victory, and just as little would they have withheld their wholehearted support and encouragement to those fighting on the front line. How did the leadership of the French CP react? Let us quote what we wrote shortly after the events of May 1968:

> They [the leaders of the CP and of the Communist-controlled trade union federation] did their best to keep the students and workers apart; they tried to get the workers out of the factories; they treated the near-general strike as though only pork-chop issues were involved; and they confined their positive proposals and

* Marx/Engels, *Werke,* vol. 19, p. 161. The Circular Letter is included in Karl Marx, *Political Writings,* vol. 3 (New York, Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 360-375. We have, however, used our own translation.

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actions to the level of parliamentary and electoral maneuvering. (MR, September 1968, p. 2)

Many studies of the 1968 events have been carried out in the intervening years; if any of them refutes, or even attempts to refute, this version of the role of the Communists, it has not come to our attention. Their policy, when put to the test, was precisely to contain and overcome the sharpest political crisis that any advanced capitalist country has experienced in the post-Second World War period. They did what Marx and Engels inferred the reformists of their time would have done in a similar situation. And the reason is very simply that such behavior is integral to the logic of the reformist position.

Erland Hofsten believes that situations comparable to May 1968 in France will recur in advanced capitalist countries in the future.* We agree. He also believes that likely causes of such situations are pollution, exhaustion of natural resources, contradictions between rich and poor countries. The list should be extended. A successful general strike, an attempted fascist coup are two possibilities that come to mind. Even developments much less easy to pin down should not be ruled out: after all the genesis of the 1968 events in France is not all that clear. In the context of the present theoretical discussion what is important is the general principle: with world capitalism entering, some would say already well into, a new and from all appearances prolonged time of deep troubles, the likelihood of sudden and profound crises breaking out almost anywhere is vastly greater than it was during the quarter century after the Second World War when such crises were confined to the countries of the Third World (with the single exception of France in 1968). It is precisely this perspective which makes so urgent the task of reconstituting revolutionary Marxism on a solid foundation. Capitalism does not need to be reformed—or saved so that it can be reformed at some time in the future.

* Whether they are called "revolutionary situations" is perhaps not very important. In one sense, indeed, the existence of a revolutionary situation can only be proved if a revolution takes place, and this obviously depends not only on objective but also on subjective factors. It may be less likely to mislead if we speak of sudden and profound crises rather than revolutionary situations.

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It needs to be replaced, and this is the responsibility of revolutionary Marxism.

How this task is to be accomplished is of course an enormously complicated question to which no one in the advanced capitalist countries has yet come up with a satisfactory answer. Here we will have to be content with a couple of suggestions which may help to promote clear thinking on the subject.*

First, there is the question of how the problem is visualized. And in line with what is said above, we think the following analogy from a book published by Monthly Review Press back in 1964—four years before May 1968—can be helpful. The author, the French Marxist Gilles Martinet, was thinking of the situations which arose in France in 1936 at the time of the electoral victory of the Popular Front and again in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War:

> Those periods in which a situation can arise which offers the possibility of a complete transformation are very brief. In the manner of a threatened organism, every society very quickly tends to secrete the means of its own defense. The torn tissues heal, the broken bones grow together again. Thus a revolutionary strategy necessarily recalls that of a siege. For years and years the enemy fortress is harassed, with no hope of conquering or destroying it. It is a war of erosion: monotonous, wearying, but inevitable. Then, one day, part of the wall crumbles. Now everything happens within a few months, or even a few weeks. Either you widen the gap and strike deep to the heart of the enemy city or you stop half-way; in the latter case, you have to watch while new walls are built up and new reinforcements are prepared from which there will come formidable counter-attacks. Then you have to start all over again.
>
> A revolutionary party should not be preoccupied only with

* To avoid misunderstanding it is necessary to add here that in criticizing and repudiating *reformism,* which is in fact a well-rounded system of political ideas and practices, we do not for a moment call in question the necessity or desirability of struggles for *reforms* in the interests of workers and other victims of capitalist exploitation and oppression. The most crucial and difficult problem of socialist movements in the advanced capitalist countries from the very beginning has been how to struggle for reforms without falling into the morass of reformism. The other side of the coin has always been how to keep clear of reformism without sliding into sectarian isolation. That there are many aspects to this problem is obvious, and we hope to continue and broaden its discussion in future issues of MR. But one thing is certain: no solutions will be found if it is not frankly confronted in all its difficulty and complexity.

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the material forces that can oppose it. It should take into consideration force of habit, respect for established hierarchy, the influence of traditional ideas. These ideas have been in circulation for so long that they seem to be part of the natural order of things. Most people are unaware of the historical nature of these ideas, their relativity and, even more, their class significance. That is why the decision must be made to strike while the iron is hot—at the very moment when a profound crisis brings everything into question. At that time, ancient values are being overthrown and there is a glimpse of what the future may hold. But, the tempest over, the waters flow back inevitably, even beyond the point at which it was thought they would hold. If, at this moment, the political structures on which rests the domination of the bourgeoisie are still in place, the movement toward *restoration* will be practically irresistible.*

The siege analogy is good; keeping it in mind can be a continuing reminder of the kind of realities a revolutionary strategy must cope with. And the insistence on the recuperative powers of the old society is also good. Martinet focuses on the short-term aspect of these powers, how they ensure that even the gravest crisis, unless exploited to the full by the forces of change, will pass and the *status quo ante* will be restored. At the same time it should not be overlooked that these recuperative powers are long-term as well as short-term: this indeed was what the Cultural Revolution in China was all about and why the struggle between the capitalist and socialist roads is bound to occupy not a month or a year or even a decade but an entire historical epoch.

One final point in conclusion: the foregoing way of visualizing the problems of the revolutionary socialist movement has an immediate strategic and tactical significance quite apart from what it may suggest in the way of methods of enlisting, educating, and mobilizing new recruits to the socialist cause. For it is important not only to forge the weapons with which to harass and attack capitalism but also and at the same time to undermine the system's vitality, its resilience, its recuperative powers. These qualities, as Martinet rightly stresses, derive

* Gilles Martinet, *Marxism of Our Time or the Contradictions of Socialism* (Monthly Review Press, 1964), pp. 29-30. At no point in the book does Martinet really follow up this most illuminating perception.

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in large part from traditional ideas and values which are deeply imbedded in a people's consciousness. It is therefore a matter of the greatest importance to discredit them, to show their historical origins, to expose their character as disguised expressions of class interests, to reach as many people as possible with the message that these ideas and values are not only not worth fighting for but deserve to be fought against. To the extent that this work is well done, the automatic recuperative powers of the system will be weakened and the chances of taking advantage of its crises for revolutionary ends correspondingly increased.

(October 6, 1976)

It is absolutely false and totally unhistorical to represent work for reforms as a drawn-out revolution, and revolution as a condensed series of reforms. A social transformation and a legislative reform do not differ according to their *duration* but according to their *essence*. The whole secret of historical transformations through the utilization of political power consists precisely in the change of simple quantitative modification into a new quality, or to speak more concretely, in the transition from one historical period, one social order, to another.

He who pronounces himself in favor of the method of legal reforms *in place of and as opposed to* the conquest of political power and social revolution does not really choose a more tranquil, surer and slower road to the *same* goal. He chooses a *different* goal. Instead of taking a stand for the establishment of a new social order, he takes a stand for surface modifications of the old order. Thus, the political views of revisionism lead to the same conclusion as the economic theories of revisionism: not to the realization of the *socialist* order, but to the reform of *capitalism;* not to the suppression of the wage system, but to the diminution of exploitation; in a word, to the elimination of the abuses of capitalism instead of to that of capitalism itself.

— Rosa Luxemburg, "Social Reform or Revolution," in *Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg* (Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 115-116.

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REFLECTIONS ON THE LEBANESE IMPASSE

BY MAHMOUD HUSSEIN

Recently there has been increasing talk of a plan to partition Lebanon. This would mean dividing the country into three distinct zones of influence whose precise boundaries still remain uncertain, but which would essentially follow these general lines: the northwest and southwest would come under the control of Syria, which would thus gain a pincer-like grip on the country; Mount Lebanon down to the eastern quarters of Beirut would be taken over by the Christian Maronite conservatives; the Islamic-progressive forces and their Palestinian allies would retain control over those regions—or what they could defend of them—heavily populated by Sunni Moslems, especially the area between Beirut and Sidon.*

From this perspective, the offensive launched by the conservative forces against the camps of Jisr al Basha and Tal az Zatar could be seen as a crucial step, since these two Palestinian

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Mahmoud Hussein is the author of *Class Struggles in Egypt: 1945-1970* (Monthly Review Press, 1973). This article was received mid-September. It was translated from the French by Kathy Brown.

* For background information on the religious sects in Lebanon, see Samih Farsoun and Walter Carroll, "The Civil War in Lebanon: Sect, Class, and Imperialism," MONTHLY REVIEW, June 1976.

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enclaves pose the last remaining obstacle to the establishment of a continuous Maronite zone. The fierce resistance put up by the Palestinian-progressive forces, at the expense of frightful losses, signals a twofold refusal: the refusal to allow themselves to be trapped by the Syrian-Maronite coalition in a dangerously isolated and vulnerable zone, and the refusal to submit to a partition settlement which, for them, would come on the heels of a major defeat.

The question of partition was raised only after the failure of the Syrian plan for a full-scale occupation of Lebanon and the rejection by most of the parties concerned of the French proposal for military intervention. And even these efforts, in turn, emerged only after a long period of civil war, in the course of which it became apparent that the antagonisms were growing more intense, and that the continuation of the fighting was creating a new and uncontrollable situation. A simple return to the *status quo ante* seemed more and more inconceivable, and none of the contending Lebanese forces appeared strong enough to impose its own solution on the others.

At this point of no return, it seems proper to pose certain basic questions—to begin with, the question of how, by what means, Lebanon became trapped in a process of disintegration that has defied any peaceful solution. Even the Palestinian resistance—long wary of such involvements—has been caught up in this process. And most of the Arab states have gradually been drawn into a sort of confrontation by proxy, with the Lebanese as stand-ins.

It is clear that powerful foreign influences are at work in Lebanon. The United States and Israel in particular—supplying money, arms, and political support to the conservative forces—have had a heavy impact on the chain of events; Syria, which has intervened on a more and more massive scale, first on one side then on the other, is playing a decisive role in the present situation; not to mention numerous other foreign powers in the West, in the East, or in the rest of the Arab world. And it is no less clear that this complex of factors is bound to lead to greater discord and increased tension.

However, even though it is surprising to hear some observers summarily dismiss the notion that the CIA is mixed up

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in the Lebanese civil war—given that the U.S. Congress has recently acknowledged CIA involvement in every major conflict of the post-Second World War era—it wouldn't do to interpret the Lebanese impasse simply in terms of foreign intervention and imperialist conspiracy.

To unravel the threads of the situation in which the country finds itself today, one must begin by understanding the specifically Lebanese context of the confrontation. It is the collapse of the principal socio-political pillars of power upon which the Lebanese state, since its inception, had rested, which is responsible for its rapid disintegration. The way was gradually paved for this collapse by the reversal of the ratio between the Christian and Moslem populations, giving the latter a majority; by Lebanon's increasing involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the June War of 1967; and by the consequent growth of a movement of popular revolt which began to overflow the confessional boundaries of political life. But the final, irreversible breakdown came only in the wake of the October War of 1973.

The pooling of the political, military, and economic resources of the Arab bourgeoisies in the face of the conflict with Israel considerably reinforced their international bargaining power vis-à-vis the Western metropolises; this had the effect of undermining the privileged status of the Maronite bourgeoisie of Lebanon—theretofore based on the "honest broker" role it had played between Arab-Moslem capital in the Arabian peninsula and the financial centers of the West. Now, with the petrodollars dealing directly, from a position of strength, with Washington, London, and Paris, not only did they cease to depend on the good offices of the Maronite bourgeoisie, but they began to throw their weight around on the Lebanese market itself, investing in one key sector after another.

This process went hand in hand with another: an affirmation of renewed national pride which began to draw the Lebanese masses into the orbit of the whole Arab unity movement. The Moslems of Lebanon, who now constituted two thirds of its population, were quite naturally moved under

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such conditions to demand constitutional and structural reforms which would put an end to a pro-Western Maronite hegemony that appeared increasingly anachronistic. And the Moslems' reform movement grew so vigorously that they no longer felt themselves in a position of military weakness vis-à-vis the ruling class, thanks to the protective presence of armed detachments of the Palestinian resistance. A realignment of the country's socio-political forces began to take shape, gradually spilling over the confessional dividing lines on which conservative Maronite authority had been based.

In the face of this process, most of the political and spiritual leaders of the Maronite community instinctively cast themselves in the role of a persecuted minority. They mobilized their troops by a systematic exaltation of religious spirit; they emphasized that the loss of their positions of power within the Lebanese state would sooner or later mean that the religious and cultural identity of the whole Maronite community would be swallowed up by the Arab-Islamic sea surrounding them. And they took as their primary target the Palestinian resistance, symbolic both of the threat of Lebanon's Arabization and of the new-found confidence of its Moslem majority. And they were to find moral support, diplomatic backing, and military aid forthcoming from the various forces, both Western and Arab, that had a stake in weakening the resistance.

What followed was an increasing polarization of Lebanon's socio-political forces around two axes: on the one side, around Gemayel, Chamoun, and Franjieh, were all those opposed to any structural reform that would reduce the Maronite community to the status of a nondominant minority and put an end to Christian and Western cultural hegemony in Lebanon; on the other, around Jumblatt and the progressive parties, were all those fighting to achieve just such a reform, in particular linking the democratization and secularization of the political system to its decisive commitment both to Arab unity and to solidarity with the Palestinian resistance.

Between the two stood the moderate Christian and Moslem forces, regrouped around Raymond Eddé, Rashid Karamé, and Saeb Salam, convinced of the need for certain reforms but

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dreaming of realizing them gradually, peacefully, neither offering provocation to the Maronite conservatives nor allowing freedom of initiative to the progressive and pro-Palestinian forces.

Events have made it abundantly clear that those who set off this process were capable neither of anticipating its full consequences nor of controlling its course. But by provoking a split within the very heart of the Lebanese bourgeoisie, the conservatives, and the foreign powers supporting them, were certain of one thing at least: they had blocked off all possibilities of a reformist solution. If the position they adopted had done nothing but arouse the radical fervor of the Lebanese masses, it would ultimately have led in one form or another to the institutionalization of a new socio-political balance of power, one more favorable to pro-Arab and progressive currents of opinion, within the context of a Lebanon that would have remained a united, bourgeois state—since the Lebanese progressives thus far are neither willing nor able to go beyond that.

But this position, by splitting the ruling class between the diehard conservative tendency and one that was moderate, reformist—and impotent—eliminated any chance of compromise within the framework of a single state and led to a confrontation between conservatives and radicals that has become more and more total—a struggle, however, in which neither of the two camps can win a decisive victory.

II

Throughout the Lebanese crisis, the major objective of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has been to try to safeguard the freedom of movement it had won in that country. Historically, in fact, the goal of remaining as independent as possible had always come first in the eyes of El Fatah's leaders, ever since those heroic days when they formed their first clandestine cells. It must not be forgotten that the Palestinian national movement was born out of a constant struggle against the police apparatus of the Arab states. These states, for the most part, were hostile to its emergence, preferring that they should be the ones to speak—according to their own interests and whims—in the name of Palestine. To restore the

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Palestinians' self-confidence throughout the territories over which they had been scattered, to coordinate their activities and mold them into a single movement of national renaissance —all this first of all implied uprooting them from their dependence on the various Arab states whose goal since 1948 had been to exploit the Palestinian cause to their own advantage.

The principle of freedom of movement, put into practice by El Fatah nearly twenty years ago, bears a precise, concrete significance, whose source lies in the specific conditions under which the Palestinian resistance movement developed. Total independence vis-à-vis the other Arab regimes is not possible, since the Palestinians have no sovereignty over any part of their country. Thus they are tributaries, in one form or another, of the states on whose territory the scattered Palestinian communities live. They are obliged to take cognizance of the regimes that govern these states—at least insofar as these regimes influence the conditions under which the Palestinians organize and struggle—and to try, with each of these governments, to reach an agreement giving the resistance the widest possible scope of activity. As it happens, the Arab states that carry particular weight as far as Palestinian decisions are concerned are those surrounding Palestine and confronting Israel: Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

Within this context, the PLO's freedom of movement depends entirely on the general capacity to maneuver it has acquired in its dealings with the different Arab regimes—including its capacity to exploit contradictions *between* these regimes—enabling it to resist the pressures of any one of them and to make the best use it can of the various forms of support offered by Arab public opinion.

It is in order to widen this margin of movement, for example, that El Fatah has systematically refused to establish a single headquarters in any one of the Arab capitals—be it Cairo, Damascus, or Beirut—preferring to disperse its centers of decision-making so as to give its leaders as much room as possible in which to maneuver.

The 1970-1971 events in Jordan, which forced the resistance gradually to abandon any form of overt military presence in that country, must have confirmed how important

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this notion of freedom of movement is for the very survival of the Palestinian national movement. And El Fatah's leadership kept these events constantly in mind in developing its strategy in Lebanon.

This strategy, despite all the tactical fluctuations dictated by the ebb and flow of the Lebanese crisis, has remained remarkably stable. It has consisted, first and foremost, of an effort to defend the rights El Fatah gained by virtue of the Cairo agreements of 1970—in particular the right to organize and arm the Palestinian refugee camps and the right to maintain training centers and bases of support for the guerrilla war against Israel. The upshot of the PLO's confrontation with the Hashemite monarchy [of Jordan] was that it no longer really had any relatively autonomous field for military maneuver against Israel *except* Lebanon—not only because of the vulnerability of the Lebanese-Israeli border, but also, and above all, because the socio-political contradictions that had been ravaging the Lebanese state apparatus since the early 1970s gave the Palestinian resistance the best possible insurance against a repetition of the Jordanian scenario. Besides, Egypt was too far away from the populated areas of Israel to be of use as a rear base, and Syria was imposing ever greater restrictions on any *fedayeen* activity within its borders, gradually confining them to ghettos—with the sole exception of the *Saiqa,* an organization whose leaders are vassals of the Syrian Baath party. Thus Lebanon began to look like the last refuge of the resistance. But here the resistance found itself faced with contradictions it was unable to control. The protection of its status implied the preservation of those socio-political rules of the game that were just what made Lebanon such a haven of security for the resistance. As long as this equilibrium was maintained, in fact, the bourgeoisie was relatively powerless in the face of the resistance: its Maronite faction could not launch a frontal assault on the resistance, since its Moslem faction would then be forced, by Islamic-progressive popular pressure, to come to the resistance's defense.

But once the Maronite conservatives had decided to break the traditional rules of the game—to shatter the bourgeois front and to attack the resistance under the banner of religious

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slogans—the resistance found itself forced to rely more and more on the Islamic-progressive forces, which in turn used it as the standard-bearer for their own aspirations. To avoid becoming isolated from the Lebanese people—as it had been from the Jordanians in 1970-1971—the PLO was thus gradually led to provide reinforcements for the struggle against the Phalangists and their allies. Ever since then it has been in the thick of the inter-Lebanese struggles, even though its original commitment had been to avoid such involvement; it has contributed to the polarization of the forces involved, even though its major concern had been to preserve the *status quo ante*.

It is this permanent contradiction between its subjective desire to stay out of the Lebanese internal conflict—indeed even, as much as possible, to play the role of a moderate arbitrator in that conflict—on the one hand, and its forced enlistment on the side of one of the contending parties, on the other, which explains the numerous tactical about-faces of the PLO, difficult to understand from the outside, and sometimes even bitterly resented by progressive Lebanese militants and by certain *fedayeen*.

The PLO leaders were continually obliged to respond to Phalangist provocations, while at the same time trying to avoid a too-vigorous Palestinian-progressive counterthrust that would only elicit fresh provocations. But by early 1975, this line of action had become increasingly difficult to maintain—especially following the April massacre of a group of Palestinian bus passengers by a Phalangist force. Indeed, the attackers had just been given a collective green light by the Americans, Israelis, and Egyptians—who wanted to raise the stakes in Lebanon in order to divert the attention of Arab public opinion from the Sadat-Rabin accords, and who were particularly anxious to teach the PLO, the principal critic of those accords, a hard lesson.

After that, events began to rush forward at breakneck speed.

The PLO trained and equipped the progressive organizations that supported it; the moderate bourgeois forces, Christian and Moslem, were outflanked; the Islamic masses increasingly identified their solidarity with the resistance with their struggle against the political hegemony of the Maronite conservatives;

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finally El Fatah, which commanded the core of the Palestinian military forces and which had tried to the last not to participate directly in the confrontation, found itself, step by step, forced to do just that.

And so the PLO has found itself more and more clearly confronted with two equally perilous alternatives: either the *de facto* partition of Lebanon—that is, the containment of the Palestinian and Islamic-progressive forces within vulnerable areas; or else a Syrian intervention, perhaps resulting in an Israeli counter-intervention, perhaps in an authoritarian restoration of internal order in Lebanon by Syria. Any of these would mean the end of Palestinian freedom of movement.

III

If there is an outstanding example of "dirty politics"—in the sense that one speaks of "dirty work"—in the Middle East today, it is surely being provided by Syria.

Contrary to popular belief, the line pursued by Damascus in Lebanon—its alliance with the conservative forces against the progressive ones—is neither a surprise nor an aberration. Rather it is simply the continuation of a political position Syria adopted some years ago. Yet there has never been any open statement of this position—for one of its key ingredients is hypocrisy. The fact is that the Damascus regime is continuing to use the language of the "Arab anti-imperialist revolution" for the purpose of winning an advantageous position within the Arab neocapitalist market.

This position dates back to 1973, the year in which the principal Arab regimes, in the face of Israeli arrogance, decided to join hands in a common front, including those labeled "progressives" as well as those known as "conservatives"—Sadat and Assad as well as Faisal—within which the economic resources commanded by some members would serve to reinforce the military strength of others. This was not a tactical front, but a strategic one. It went beyond the military confrontation with Israel *per se*. It regarded this confrontation as just one of the necessary stages in a plan to restore balance to power relations in the Middle East, permitting the existing

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Arab regimes to recover their prestige and credibility—and thus to negotiate with Israel from a position of strength.

The consequences of the October War were not quite what these regimes had expected.

By giving the military initiative back to Israel, the fortunes of war necessarily made the subsequent bargaining far more complex—and, notably, enabled the United States to split the front formed by Israel's enemies on the very eve of the negotiations. This explains the separate agreements concluded with the governments of Egypt and Syria; it also explains the tensions between these countries. But beyond these vicissitudes, the war had some profound effects on the political and economic orientation of the two regimes: it provided their leaders with conclusive proof that they had to work out some means of coexisting with Israel and that such a settlement could only be achieved under the aegis of the United States. And the consequent need to re-establish preferential relations with the United States—and with the West in general—proved congenial to the socio-economic interests of the Egyptian and Syrian state bourgeoisies who, once installed in the seats of economic power, were impatient to put an end to the previous era of austerity and to re-establish, to their own profit, the flow of trade and private investment. And, finally, it so happened that those who commanded the immense financial resources of the Arabian peninsula were also encouraging a movement in this direction, promising to give generous assistance to a new Arab capitalist "take-off."

That signaled the end of the era during which the Arab world had been divided into two camps—Nasser's and Faisal's—and ushered in a new age in which the Arab bourgeoisies no longer had to choose between a humiliating colonial status and an exhilarating, but insecure, anti-colonial posture. Now, given proper coordination of their efforts and resources, they had hopes of attaining the status of junior partners of the great Western bourgeoisies. Since as a group they possessed a certain amount of leverage against the West, they believed they would henceforth have a real bargaining position in their dealings with the United States. But this position would be undermined by the breakup of the Arab bourgeois coalition.

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The Egyptian regime, which faced an internal crisis far more severe than Syria's, went to work in record time: it made no bones about announcing exactly where it stood; it publicly defended its new strategic choices; and it agreed to conclude a separate treaty with Israel—the second Sinai accord—which virtually ended hostilities between Cairo and Tel Aviv, for three years at least.

The Syrian regime had no objection in principle to this accord—in fact, it would very much have liked to conclude a similar agreement. But the Israelis' ploy had been to accept some loss of ground in the Sinai peninsula so as to avoid any withdrawal on the Golan Heights. Syrian President Assad now found himself in an extremely tricky situation. Since he could no longer rely on Egyptian military support, he now lacked any effective deterrent against Israel. And this, in turn, paralyzed him politically, threatening the very life of his regime. Unable to persuade Syrian public opinion to accept an extended cease-fire in return for a few minor realignments on the Sinai front, he could no longer simply sit back and wait. So Assad tried to find a way out of his dilemma through the creation of a front extending from Lebanon to Jordan—and including the PLO—which would have the effect of isolating Egypt and emphasizing the importance of Syria's role in Arab mobilization and unity. On this basis, he could then conduct negotiations with Israel—in the role of arbiter for the entire *Mashreq* [Arab East].

Hussein of Jordan saw obvious advantages in this plan: once more he would have a voice, a role to play in the confrontation with Israel—that is, he would be released from the exile into which he had been cast following the Rabat summit conference. The PLO, on the other hand, tended to be suspicious of such a rapprochement. But Assad assured the PLO that the front would provide it with a means of exerting pressure on Hussein to reopen Jordan to Palestinian bases. It is true that the leaders of the resistance could offer no alternative to the Damascan policy. Facing abandonment by Egypt and provocation in Lebanon, they had to protect their rear bases at all costs.

From autumn 1975 until early 1976, Assad's aim was thus to reinforce the Palestinian and Islamic forces in order to prevent the Maronite conservatives from gaining a military victory

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and then, once the danger had been averted, from splitting Lebanon in two. He gained his twofold objective—but only at the price of provoking two crises which, little by little, were to force him to reverse his alliances. During this period, indeed, it seemed that amid the rapid polarization of all Lebanese society, the traditional moderate leaders of the Sunnite community, incapable of assuming political-military leadership of the Moslem forces, would be put out of the running, leaving a clear field to the radical organizations—with Kamal Jumblatt at their head and the resistance behind them. But as soon as this front saw the balance of power shift in its favor, it threw itself into preparation for a counter-offensive against the conservative strongholds, hoping to impose on them once and for all the structural reforms they had hitherto rejected.

It was at this point that Damascus was to be led to a change in position. On the one hand, it was clear that a decisive victory for the Islamic-progressive forces, in alliance with the PLO, would throw them into opposition to the Syrian plan—with neither partner willing to accept the idea of Syrian control over Lebanon. On the other hand, such a prospect was equally unacceptable to both the Americans and the Israelis. The latter, in fact, did not hesitate to declare that, in such an eventuality, they too would intervene.

Still, Washington let it be known that it would not object to seeing Damascus become more directly involved in Lebanon for the purpose of mediating between the warring parties. And so in order to realize his initial objective, Assad was forced to turn in directions diametrically opposed to those he had envisioned at the start. Instead of continuing to aid the progressive front, he had to begin to pressure it ever more strongly, block its offensive, and lend direct support to the faltering conservative troops. He had to re-establish the old balance of power and make it impossible for the Lebanese to work out any solution among themselves—so that the Syrian army would appear to be the sole force capable of restoring order and peace to the country.

It took time for the cruel realization of the Syrian about-face and its political-military implications to be brought home to the Palestinian-progressive front, and it took time for the

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front to pull itself together and gather its resources to survive this betrayal. And it was in order to steal a march on the Palestinian-progressive front, taking advantage of the confusion in its ranks, that Damascus at this point decided to launch a surprise invasion of Lebanon. Assad envisioned a lightning campaign, to be welcomed with open arms by a war-weary population and to be completed before the Palestinian-progressive forces had time to mount any cohesive counterattack. Naturally, he had already secured not only the approval of the Maronite conservatives—who weren't likely to have another such chance to gain a second wind—but also, and above all, the tacit consent of Washington and Tel Aviv. These two, which had long hesitated to support Syrian intervention, finally conceded that compared to the other possible solutions for saving the Maronite conservatives from defeat, it represented the lesser evil. At worst, they expected, the result would be a definite weakening of the resistance and its progressive allies. But they hoped for the best: not only the total collapse of the resistance and its allies, but the paralysis of the whole *Mashreq*—Syria itself, the area between Syria and Iraq, the entire Arab League: precisely the area Syria had planned to unite and reinforce under its own authority.

And it was these interests, not Assad's hopes, which subsequently began to be realized. For neither the PLO nor the progressive front, though taken by surprise, was willing to yield to the Syrian power play. For the PLO to do so would have meant submitting to total dependence on the Syrian Baath and, ultimately, permitting Damascus to speak in its name—to haggle over the fate of the Palestinians in the pursuit of its own selfish interests.

As for the progressive Lebanese forces, to give in to Syria would have meant not only the relegation of their country to the status of a vassal state, but also a return to the *status quo ante* —now even more intolerable than before, due to the civil war and the tens of thousands it had already left dead between the two camps. Confirmation of this view came straight out of the barrels of Syrian guns—and with it, the bitter taste of betrayal. That is why the Palestinians and radicals chose to resist. And

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that is why the people in the major cities of Lebanon rallied to their cause.

In the face of this mass mobilization, which Damascus had not anticipated, the Syrian regime had to spread itself thin. In order to pursue its goal of gradually encircling and strangling the Palestinian-Lebanese centers of resistance, it was forced to deploy its military forces over a larger and larger area and to anticipate a longer and longer struggle. Syria cut off the resistance's land and sea outlets one by one; prevented arms, ammunition, and provisions from reaching it; destroyed its oil installations and fuel storage tanks; helped the conservative Maronite forces regain the offensive and wipe out Palestinian-progressive enclaves in the north and in the eastern quarters of Beirut.

Finally, Syria encouraged the moderate politicians, who for a time had been absent from the scene, to seize the political initiative. The purpose was to end the radical forces' monopoly over the leadership of the Moslem masses, to divide these masses, and to increase the isolation of the progressives to the greatest extent possible. In so doing, Syria foreclosed the possibility of a rapprochement between the left and the Phalangists—who, growing restless under the Syrian yoke, might have confronted Syria with the beginnings of a united Lebanese movement. And at the same time Syria pressed the Palestinian resistance to agree to its conditions: it would not protect the resistance against the conservative forces unless the PLO acknowledged Syrian tutelage.

To the revolutionaries, to the progressives of the Arab world—to all those who consider support for the Palestinian resistance one of their primary objectives—by now it must be quite apparent that the goal of Syrian policy is to deprive the PLO of its most precious possession: its freedom of movement. It is clear, too, that Syria is pursuing this goal with the blessing of the great powers, which, whatever the differences between them, are united in their desire to see the PLO forced to toe the line, to sit at a bargaining table where there will be no real opportunity to make its voice heard—a bargaining table, in short, at which the Palestinian people's aspirations toward unity and sovereignty over Palestinian soil will once again be sacrificed.

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THE DANCE

BY MIKLÓS VÁMOS

The following delightful short story—a fitting commentary on late-twentieth-century European culture, East and West—appeared (in English) in the Spring 1976 issue of *The Hungarian Quarterly* (published in Budapest) and is reproduced here by permission. The translation is by Eva Rácz.—THE EDITORS

The guests were arriving in rapid succession. A handsome Opel had just rounded the corner. He paused for a second in front of the steps and then went up. The Doorman greeted him with a deep bow.

A bald Fiat-600 appeared under the foliage. Timidly he approached the big glass doors. The Doorman blocked his entrance.

"Sorry, but this is strictly a coat-and-tie affair."

The little Fiat was apologetic:

"I didn't have time to go home, and you see. . . ."

The Doorman made a prohibitive gesture:

"Without a tie—to this dance!" He shook his head and shrugged his shoulders.

In the meantime a Mercedes had rolled up. The cloakroom attendants rushed out to receive him and help him out of his coat. They carried back the fur garment as if it were breakable.

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The Mercedes stepped to the looking-glass, examined himself for a moment, smoothing back a few strands of greying hair. Then with a sigh he went into the Main Hall.

The Doorman stared after him so hard that he forgot to check whether the Wartburgs admitted in the meantime had been properly attired for the occasion.

By then the cloakroom was filled with layers upon layers of coats and wraps. Most of the guests had arrived. (The cream of society.) A few late-comers slipped in unobtrusively through the ornate side-doors to the Hall.

The dance began and the opening couple—a Skoda and an NSU—were a big hit.

Still, most of the crowd gathered around the tables loaded with delicacies in the Hunting Hall. A young Volkswagen was noisily imbibing, assisted by a little Trabant. "Try this! You've never had anything like it, I bet! It's high-octane Super!"

"Home-grown Hungarian ÁFOR?"

"Yes, but special vintage!"

The Volkswagen went back to his slurping. At the end of the buffet table two fat Warszawas were sampling the short drinks. Some three-star Shell they found had made them so tipsy that their wheels almost rolled out from under them.

The atmosphere of the Main Hall was now super-charged.

The dancers were flushed with the heat and the air was stifling hot. The attendants opened the windows.

Suddenly a commotion was heard from among the velvet-upholstered armchairs as a sleek gleaming white sports car made his way through them. The famous football hero! Several women—among them a daringly décolleté Moskwich—nearly fainted.

The dance floor was packed with couples dancing fender-to-fender. Yet, more couples kept gliding in. A Renault with something of a bay-window was escorting a soft-centered sweetie of a Steyr Puch onto the floor. He had asked her to dance a minute ago in the Green Niche.

"I haven't even introduced myself. CNY 32-38," said the Renault, bowing stiffly.

"CTY," Steyr Puch offered her hand, unceremoniously giving only her first name.

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They danced. CNY 32-38 had an easy time. The soft-centered sweetie almost melted in admiration when she found out that her partner was an architect, the director of the "KRAFT" Home Design Studio, with a monthly salary of over 9,000 forints plus bonuses. In addition he had a beautiful villa near Lake Balaton, a week-end cottage in the Mátra Mountains, and was not even old. (He had less than 40 thousand kilometers on him.)

"And over there, who's that? A Skoda 1000 MB by the window nudged her companion wallflower.

"You mean that Peugeot?" the other Skoda asked.

"No, behind him!"

"Oh, that new Taunus?"

"No! The yellow Wartburg. There, the way I'm trying *not* to point."

"Oh, there, that's nobody."

"Just a nobody. A worker from the Ganz-MÁVAG."

"How did he get here?"

"He won his Wartburg in the Lottery."

Behind a big potted palm by the door the Renault with something of a bay-window was kissing the Steyr Puch. Soft-centered and ready to melt as she was, CTY tenaciously kept her eyes closed to avoid looking at the potbellied man whom she found so unattractive. She concentrated instead on the architect's week-end house and resolutely patted CNY 32-38's spare tire.

"And what about that marvelous-looking black Ford?" one of the Skodas was asking her girl-friend.

"Oh, an expatriate," was the terse reply. "A '56er' visiting his younger brother."

In the meantime the orchestra took a break. The couples left the floor, carefully avoiding collisions. Here everybody knew the Highway Code.

Let's follow, for instance, that Small Car in glasses. He stops in front of the potted palm and politely gives the right-of-way to an Impala from the Ministry. Then he goes in search of his little soft-centered-sweetie-wife Steyr Puch. He catches sight of her in the shadow of the palm tree as CNY 32-38 is stroking her under-chassis. The small car quickly turns and runs

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from the scene in total embarrassment, almost colliding with his boss, although *he* and *not* his superior had been coming from the right. He puts on the brakes fast. How he would like to be a few cubic centimeters bigger, or at least have an extra cylinder! That would at least make him feel more at home. But he feels like a trespassing bicycle. All Small Cars are like that.

It was eleven o'clock. The orchestra took its place again on the platform and struck up a waltz. The dancing resumed.

The music carried far into the distance. In District Eight a cracked Shaving Mirror and a Washing-up Apron were watching TV. The Pop Festival was on, but it was impossible to enjoy because the far-away waltz drowned it out.

They soon turned off the TV and leaned on the open windowsill nostalgically listening to the music.

One little cigarette chick,
The best brand there is. . . .

Shaving Mirror MM nodded his head in rhythm to the far-off music. Washing-up Apron gazed at him lovingly.

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ON HALLIDAY'S CONTRIBUTION TO UNDERSTANDING JAPAN

BY HERBERT P. BIX

The publication of Jon Halliday's *A Political History of Japanese Capitalism* (New York: Pantheon Asia Library, 1975) marks a uniquely important event in our understanding of Japan in this country, for it is the first Marxist history in English of a century of Japanese capitalism.

In ten analytical chapters and 300 pages of carefully argued, massively documented text, Halliday has replotted the facts and events of Japan's historical development, from the modern epoch (1868-1945) right through to the contemporary one (1945-present). By adding five appendices packed with statistical data on everything from higher education to overseas investments, plus another hundred pages of detailed notes, he turns a brilliant textbook on Japan into an encyclopedic guide, of value to students and general readers alike.

A central characteristic of *A Political History* is its analysis of the Meiji Restoration. The first, longest, most satisfying chapter defines the Restoration as embracing a whole series

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of events, issues, and processes spread out over a 35-year period, from the opening of Japan by Perry in 1853-1854 to the installation of the Diet and promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890. In contrast to most establishment scholarship which begins by defining the Restoration narrowly and ends by trivializing its importance in world and Asian regional history, Halliday's wide definition renders possible an approach in terms of the interaction between internal "developments in the relations of production within Japan" (national moments) and the external "irruption of the Western capitalist powers" (international moments). Here is a methodology which, by taking the reader through a detailed class analysis of Tokugawa feudalism and the process of the overthrow of Bakufu power by Restoration power, succeeds in capturing the Restoration's significance as the ineluctable product of conditions generated within feudal society. At the same time, by counterposing to these internal conditions of Japanese political economy the world historical conditions which acted upon feudal society, it shows how the Restoration's unfolding was shaped at every turn by a larger, external context of events. Halliday's "dialectic of the internal and the external," developed and refined initially by Japanese Marxist historians, offers the best chance of recovering the full drama and significance of the era of state construction in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Thus, having fitted the dynamics of nineteenth-century Japanese history into the global processes of formation and reorganization of the world capitalist market system, Halliday shows how the manner of China's incorporation into the world economy (via the Opium Wars and the erection of the unequal treaty system) delayed and regulated Japan's integration into it. The specific ways in which Japan's rulers coped with their country's forced opening and with capitalism in turn shaped and limited Korea's response to the expanding capitalist mode of production. As his diagnosis of "The Meiji State" (chapter 1) draws to an end, Halliday underlines the thesis that

> while developing as an imperialist power itself, Japan remained in an essentially "third world" relationship with the West com-

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mercially, while holding the position of an "advanced" capitalist country vis-à-vis the rest of Asia—and here the *domestic* structure of Japanese industry forced by the unequal treaties tended to push further along the road of imperialism which its own political and military leaders were backing for other relatively autonomous reasons. (p. 61)

Finally, he reveals how the world capitalist market system generated, by the end of the century, new organic relations among the East Asian peoples—imperialist relations among oppressor and oppressed nations and classes of a kind that had not existed before in world history. With the fates of all the Asian peoples, especially those of the Japanese, Koreans, and Chinese, thus intertwined in the imperialist nexus, Halliday turns to consider schematically "The Beginnings of the Left."

Read with its accompanying notes (which, incidentally, are not indexed) chapter 2 is a very brief, though in parts exemplary, introduction to the prewar left. The limited, uniformly unsympathetic sources on the Japanese left available in English make it, in fact, the best short introduction to the subject. Yet as just a chapter in *A Political History of Japanese Capitalism,* it inevitably telescopes too many important trends and theses, across too long a span of time, to be entirely satisfactory: from class contestation in late Meiji–early Taisho, to the ideological components of the left before and after the First World War, down to the virtual extinction of the illegal Japan Communist Party (JCP) in May 1933, when the last round of mass arrests of its members and sympathizers occurred.

What seems to get lost in such telescoping is an adequate appreciation of the intellectual advance made by Japanese Marxists as a result of the May 1932 "Theses Concerning the Situation in Japan and the Tasks of the JCP," the key programmatic document of the party prior to 1951.* In attempting

* The May 1932 Theses were drafted by the Executive Committee of the Comintern (EKKI), with Katayama Sen and Nozaka Sanzõ among others participating, and drew heavily on O. Kuusinen's March 2, 1932, report to the Comintern presidium on "Japanese Imperialism and the Nature of the Japanese Revolution." Although a political document, it would seem correct to view it as the end-product of a fruitful, decade-long, Japanese-European (chiefly Russian) intellectual collaboration.

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to grapple with the conjunction of class forces at the time of the Manchurian Incident, "as well as the character and tasks of the coming revolution in Japan," Japanese and Soviet Marxists made a major conceptual breakthrough in understanding the "emperor system" (*tennō sei*) as the ultimately determining element in the superstructure, relatively independent of its material foundations—the landlord system and monopoly capitalism. It was the emperor system that universalized the class aims of the ruling bloc composed of the parasitic landlord strata, the titled (and financial) aristocracy, the big bourgeoisie (*zaibatsu*), and the civil and military bureaucracy. As the 1932 Theses stressed:

> The absolute monarchy that was formed in Japan after 1868 has maintained in its hands unlimited power in spite of all changes of policy, and has constantly increased its bureaucratic apparatus for tyranny and oppression of the working classes. . . . [I]t has maintained its independence, its relatively significant role, and its absolute character, thinly concealed by pseudo-constitutional forms. . . . The emperor system is the main pillar of political reaction and of all the remnants of feudalism in the country. The state apparatus of the emperor system [*tennō sei kokka kikō*] is the backbone of the present dictatorship of the exploiting classes, and its destruction must be considered the first of the main revolutionary tasks in Japan.*

At the very moment when Imperial Japan was entering a period of protracted war and crisis, Japanese Marxists had arrived at a theoretical framework for depicting the structural interconnections between Japanese imperialism, capitalism, and the state power apparatus. And thus "the outstanding theoretical contribution of the [prewar] epoch" (p. 80), as Halliday correctly terms the Marxist (Rōnō-Kōza) debates of the late twenties and early thirties, went beyond the scientific work done on determining the degree to which Japan had achieved a "bourgeois revolution" in the course of its transition from

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* I have altered the unsatisfactory translation in G. M. Beckmann and Okubo Genji, *The Japan Communist Party 1922-1945* (Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 336, to make it more literal. An important new source on the May 1932 Theses, from which I profited much, is Tōyama Shigeki, "Tennō sei to Nihon teikokushugi" (The Emperor System and Japanese Imperialism) in *Rekishi hyōron*, no. 300 (April 1975).

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feudalism to capitalism, to include efforts to determine the nature of the "emperor system" itself—the concentrated expression in politics of a "feudal remnant." Such was one of the great intellectual achievements of Japan's prewar left, to which Halliday might well have given more attention.

Chapter 2, however, brings another of the book's central characteristics into sharper focus. John Dower, in his introduction, terms this Halliday's concern "with history's victims, whether they be the workers and peasants ground under the wheels of 'progress' or the peoples of those less developed countries on whose backs and corpses the 'great powers' rise." (xxvi) This concern derives less from an external moralistic critique of the historical record than from a keen understanding of the workings of the capitalist system, in which racial and economic discrimination is bred both within the processes of primitive accumulation and at every successive stage thereafter. Such discrimination was evidenced most strikingly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the way the Japanese bourgeoisie in its search for profits assaulted the peasantry on the main islands, nearly exterminated the Ainu minority on Hokkaido, and disrupted the lives of the Okinawan islanders, not to mention the suffering it inflicted on the Koreans and Chinese. Today the reproduction of exploitation and discrimination under capitalism is to be seen in the more sophisticated ways Japanese industry exploits its workers while continuing to mouth the rhetoric of "harmony" and "love."

Of the four remaining chapters treating Japan's modern epoch—"Japanese Imperialism to the Washington Conference of 1921-1922" (chapter 3), "Politics from the Constitution to the Washington Conference (1890-1922)" (chapter 4), "From the Washington Conference to the Pacific War (1922-1941)" (chapter 5), and "The Pacific War" (chapter 6)—the last is especially worth mentioning. Like chapter 1, "The Pacific War" is so tersely and incisively argued and so destructive of so many popular myths on the complex subject it treats, that it could well stand on its own, as a model discussion, suited especially for assignment in the college classroom. The other three chapters, though they too stake out many important and equally correct theses on imperialism, militarism, the political

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parties, and fascism, are less satisfactory. But since they raise questions all students of Japanese capitalism confront, it is worthwhile to mention some of them here.

The first question concerns Halliday's treatment of early prewar Japanese imperialism. By discussing it almost exclusively in terms of colonialist annexations and imperialist wars, interventions, and conferences—rather than in terms of the economics of trade and investments, or of state and private capital exports—he reinforces the general tendency to see Japan's early imperialism, at least down to the Washington Conference, as largely a superstructural phenomenon—the highest stage of "capitalism without capital." (p. 100) But Japanese industrial capitalism and Japanese imperialism "arrived together" on the stage of East Asian history, one supplementing the other. It would therefore seem reasonable to seek to account for the latter by an equally detailed investigation of substructural matters, such as the various concrete ways in which the Japanese colonial sphere served the class interests of the industrial bourgeoisie and the parasitic landlords, especially in the period between the Sino-Japanese War and the start of the First World War. Perhaps future research centering on this pre-1914 period will demonstrate that the industrial bourgeoisie, the parasitic landlords, and the newly created financial and titled aristocracy lacked neither desire nor capital to invest in colonies abroad. What chiefly held them back were depressed business conditions at home immediately preceding both the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, and unsettled international conditions surrounding Korea and Manchuria at the time. Others following Halliday's lead in this area might also want to give more attention to the ramifying structural interconnections between Japan's original colonial sphere, the Imperial Household which administered the Emperor's vast properties, and the *zaibatsu*. Prototype studies along these lines are urgently needed today to deepen our understanding of the current forms of integration between Japanese and American imperialism and the neocolonial regimes in non-Communist Asia.

Halliday concludes his discussion of "The Nature of Early Japanese Imperialism" by again stressing that it was impelled by "the nature of the kind of development fostered inter-

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nally by the ruling bloc [which] precluded any great increase in consumer purchasing power." (p. 102) He thus underscores the crucial point that economic and class reasons stemming from "the Meiji political compromise" ultimately compelled Japan to seek an expanding exclusive economic sphere of interest in East Asia. But his political analysis of the later stages of Japanese imperialism would have benefited had it been carried forward in closer connection with economic analysis. Future studies of Japanese imperialism in the decade after 1919—the period of monopoly capitalism's rapid development—will have to pay less attention to proving the lasting importance of the Meiji settlement and more to detailing the changes brought on by the First World War in the relationship between Japan's domestic economic structure and the international political process.

Halliday's account of politics and the military in the period from 1890 to 1922 describes succinctly how the political parties were gradually integrated within the Meiji constitutional order after 1890—"the victory of the system over the parties, for what they were worth" (p. 107)—and how the military too was integrated: "Although it had its own specific autonomy it was not separate from the 'political'" (p. 108) and never constituted "anything like a 'dual government.'" (p. 349, fn. 25) He argues, however, that the "process of integration" was "perfected" on the eve of the First World War. "With the virtually complete imbrication of bureaucracy and parties, the main elements of the Japanese political system were in place." (p. 109)

But by stressing that it was "perfected" at such an early time, and more importantly by employing the concept of integration without first clarifying its several senses and specific references, he tends to foreclose a closer look at the relationship between the parties and the mass movements for democratization. It is, after all, rather important to show that the Japanese people did not traverse a straight line from the Meiji political settlement to the crisis of the 1930s. Along the way lay possibilities for a different outcome. The seeds of mass movements from below had already sprouted before the winter of fascism set in—that is, before, during, and after the First World War.

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Rather than lumping all the post-1913 cabinets together, it would be more useful to show the different effects each had in dispersing and deflecting the energies of the mass movements. After the 1918 Rice Riots democratic mass movements continued to be damaged by their treatment at the hands of the bourgeois-landlord parties; but at the same time they were growing in self-consciousness and learning to perceive the established parties more realistically as political fronts for the rule of monopoly capital and appendages of the state structure which were finding it increasingly difficult to mediate the conflicting class interests of the ruling bloc.

Of course Halliday is too acute a historian to advance his integration thesis beyond limits, let alone to assume that integration equals unity. In a later observation (citing a text by Furuya Tetsuo—p. 359, fn. 104) he calls attention to the fact that the ruling class in the 1930s never achieved a unified political leadership, and went into war with China, and later with the United States, with its ranks divided.

But the problem of the perfection-of-integration thesis does at least suggest the need to rethink the angle from which to view the succeeding period of Japanese history, the 1920s to 1945, particularly if whatever alternatives were open to the Japanese people to resist war and fascism are not to be entirely neglected. Halliday's approach to this period is to argue that "in the 1920s and 1930s Japan did not undergo a basic change of political regime, much less degenerate from 'democracy' to 'fascism,'" and that "there was fundamental agreement between business and the military on an imperialist policy." (p. 116) Pushing this continuity thesis further, he concludes, in a section titled, "The Question of Japanese 'Fascism,'" that

> Japan was a violent and aggressive country in Asia well before Pearl Harbor (1941) or the Mukden Incident (1931). The oppression of the working classes and political repression against proletarian militancy had been highly developed at least since the turn of the century. If Japan was "fascist" in 1941, it perhaps should be called "fascist" in 1915. (p. 140)

Thus, although he recognizes "that there was a fascist *movement* in Japan from the 1920s to 1945, in the sense that fascist forces were at work," (p. 140) he rejects, in the end, both

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the fascist label and the fascist hypothesis for Japan. In support of these theses, Halliday was obliged, in this area too, to clear away layers of ideological obfuscation and myth which hindered understanding of the interaction between the structure of Japan's national capitalism and the world political economy. Not only had Western scholars in the Japan field swept under the rug the problematics of class conflict and rule (and of imperialism), they had also overweighted the role of the prewar parties and treated the democratizing ferment of the "Taisho Democracy" era as though it had run parallel, instead of counter, to the history of the rise of political parties and party cabinets. This meant, in effect, that both the period of the 1930s and the phenomenon of Japanese fascism (not even acknowledged to have existed in most modernization studies on Japan) were depicted as aberrations, radical departures from a basically sound course of normal (constitutional) political party development. Unwilling to condone such gross superficiality, Halliday took a strongly critical stance toward the *entire* period.

Yet not all radical scholars will want to deploy the fascism hypothesis without first differentiating analytically the categories of government and state, the form of the political regime and the typology of the state, and, lastly, the natures which pertain to each. Nor will they want to accept a perspective which categorically rules out any demarcation of the late 1920s and 1930s as a special stage in Japanese history. They may also be unwilling to reject the fascist label and hypothesis for Japan from the 1920s to 1945, on the simple ground that the concept itself smacks of "Eurocentrism," or because the elements of continuity with preceding periods of Japanese history are so numerous, so clear-cut, or so tightly interwoven with elements of discontinuity as to make impossible an exact dating of when the regime in Japan became "fascist." If they try to delineate what Japan had in common with other countries that experienced fascism during these decades and then go on to encompass both change and tradition during the "fascist epoch," they might deepen our understanding not only of the dynamics of change in this transitional period between the modern (1868-1945) and contemporary (post-1945) epochs of Japan's history, but also of the problems of continuity which arose at the

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very end of Japan's first fascist cycle. For only then did the imperial state bureaucracy and private monopoly capitalism complete that historic structural fusion that is the hallmark of today's Japanese political economy. But this can only be done by first centering on elements of discontinuity which set 1920-1945 off from the periods which frame it on either side.

If a proper balance is to be struck between the historical themes of continuity and discontinuity in the history of Japan, then the second, longer part of Halliday's work fully meets that condition. There are several respects in which his analysis of post-1945 Japan is superbly realistic, pregnant with serious implications for future U.S.-Japanese-Asian relations, and therefore deserving of the widest reading. Limitations of space permit me to comment only on the two which allow a further consideration of a problem mentioned earlier, i.e., the emperor system.

First, in treating the occupation period (1945-1952), Halliday stresses the theme of the re-integration of Japanese capitalism into the American-dominated world economy. Citing a post-Pearl Harbor address to a Mitsubishi Inter-Company Conference in December 1941 by the head of the Mitsubishi Holding Company, Baron Iwasaki Koyata, Halliday shows that forward-looking Japanese capitalists were even then anticipating a restoration of the U.S.-Japanese capitalist alliance:

> Our American and English friends [declaimed Iwasaki] have up until present been sharing with us the same enterprise and interests . . . as good friends and partners. Unfortunately divided, we now belong to two warring groups of nations. The state may have to take lawful steps on their properties, but our old friendship must never be affected accordingly. . . . If and when peace comes, they will again prove to be our worthy partners in the same manner as they were our good friends in the past. . . . (p. 161)

By 1952 a reorganized Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was once again repairing and manufacturing war equipment, including aircraft under license to the U.S. Far Eastern Air Force. Today it is the largest of Japan's military-industrial contractors.

Did the nature of Japanese monopoly capitalism remain unchanged then after 1945? Indeed not. Halliday demonstrates that before 1945 it had been characterized economically by

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(a) the commanding role that *zaibatsu* family holding companies played, (b) its partial dependence on a state-controlled financial and heavy industrial sector (including arsenals, semi-official banks, and overseas concerns like the South Manchuria Railway Company), (c) heavy dependence on war production, and (d) intimate structural links to the landlord system in the countryside and the Manchuria-Korea-Taiwan colonial sphere abroad. By contrast, today it is bank-centered and its dominant characteristics derive largely from the division of labor worked out in the mid-1950s with U.S. government and industry leaders under the Security Treaty System. Moreover the rapid development of Japanese capitalism in the 1950s and 1960s was dependent externally on America's imperialist wars in Korea and Indochina and internally on low-wage urban labor and the dissolution of the peasant class. Thus both change and continuity mark the historical trajectory of postwar Japanese capitalism.

But Halliday places the accent where it belongs: on the determining influence of AMPO or the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty System, a designation avoided by non-Marxists but one that connotes adequately the whole panoply of Japan's political, military, and economic subordination to the United States. This system was constructed *in stages* and was by no means completed when Japan regained its formal independence in April 1952, or for that matter even today. This is the second feature of Halliday's analysis of the contemporary epoch that deserves underlining.

At one level he shows that the Security Treaty System consists of bilateral but essentially unequal treaties. Initially, it rested on the U.S.-drafted Peace Treaty and U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of September 8, 1951, the U.S.-Japan Administrative Agreement of February 28, 1952, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of March 1954, and related trade and agricultural agreements. But at another level these legal arrangements and the complex levers they establish for reproducing Japan's dependence and subordination to the United States have been interiorized, and thus exist as incorporated parts of the very state structure of Japan—a fact which suggests that we are dealing here with an intellectual construct that is every bit as

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important for understanding the *structural interconnections* between imperialism, monopoly capitalism, and state power in postwar Japan as the emperor system concept was for analyzing those relationships in the prewar period. Further, the Security Treaty System is far stronger and more supportive of American imperialism than NATO, and has engendered forms of control which have no European equivalent.

Thus within the Security Treaty System the four strongest links between Japanese and American imperialism are the Japanese multinationals, the corrupt Liberal-Democratic Party, the Self-Defense Forces, and the "symbolic" emperor system. Leaving aside the first three, it is clear that the fourth functions today as a double symbol: nationally as the constitutionally defined, hereditary "symbol of the Japanese state and of the unity of the Japanese people"; internally as the *de facto* symbol of Japan's continued subordination to American imperialism. Perhaps that is another reason why apologists for the Security Treaty System on both sides of the Pacific have been so sensitive about refurbishing the tarnished imperial image abroad.

In 1975, for example, when Emperor Hirohito's war responsibility was being hotly debated in Japan and there was a growing feeling that the AMPO era and the high-growth era would both come to an end together, the current dean of American Japan experts, Harvard's E. O. Reischauer, prepared a public-relations pamphlet for the occasion of Hirohito's fall visit to the United States. In it he argued that "since the present Emperor has always been a conscientious constitutional monarch, it really is not proper to inquire what his own particular views may have been, even under the old system."* Needless to say, there has been little evidence of a rush by Japan experts to violate the taboo that Reischauer, following the lead of Japan's own rightists, has pronounced on critical discussion of the Emperor and his prewar role.

The briefest reflection shows why: the academic establishment as a whole has been as uncritically supportive of the

* Edwin O. Reischauer, *The Emperor of Japan—A Profile on the Occasion of the Visit by the Emperor and Empress to the United States, September 30th to October 13th, 1975,* published by the Japan Society of New York.

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Security Treaty System as it has been in embracing and disseminating "modernization theory." The latter might be defined as the laudatory reconstruction of post-Meiji history, informed by a naively mechanistic and evolutionary social science. During Japan's high-growth decade of the 1960s, this theory triumphed in academic circles, particularly in the United States, providing ideological-historical support for the postwar U.S.-Japan dependency relationship, and a constitutive element in the formation of Japan's own new nationalism.

The place Halliday's volume occupies in the field of Japan studies now becomes clear. So many liberal scholars studying the Japanese model of development like to prate about their independence, objectivity, moderation, and sobriety of judgment in evaluating Japan's record at home and abroad; but their real tendency is to jump from one extreme position to another in ways that unerringly reflect the common ground between their own latest intellectual constructs and the needs and objectives of the ruling classes they serve. Thus it was to be expected that the pendulum swing away from "militarism," as the "in" conceptual framework for analyzing Japan in the prewar period, would come to rest in the postwar period with an equally extremist "modernization theory" framework, which even today is still the dominant ideology informing scholarship in the field. What was unnatural, however, was the relatively long ascendancy of this model in the West. It was not until 1975, when Pantheon's Asia Library published both Halliday's frontal assault on anti-Marxist histories of Japan written from the standpoint of crude evolutionism, and (under a new title) an earlier classic, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (1940),* with an inspired introductory essay by John Dower, that this ascendancy was challenged. Now, thanks to these more open and intelligent interpretations, informed by a concern for history and its victims that is at once passionate and theoretically mature, the highly ideological "modernization theory" approach to the study of Japanese history has been effectively neutralized.

* Included, together with some new items, in John W. Dower, ed., *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman.* Only Norman's 24-page bibliography for *Japan's Emergence* has been omitted from this new volume.

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THE NEW MAO LITERATURE

By Ben Stavis

Stuart Schram, ed., *Chairman Mao Talks to the People.* N.Y.: Pantheon, 1974. 352 pp. $2.95.

Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought (1949-1968). Arlington, Va.: Joint Publications Research Service, 1974. 498 pp. $16.50.

David Milton, Nancy Milton, and Franz Schurmann, *People's China.* N.Y.: Vintage, 1974. 673 pp. $3.95.

Jerome Ch'en, ed., *Mao Papers.* London: Oxford University Press, 1970. 221 pp. $10.00.

Jerome Ch'en, ed., *Mao.* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969. 176 pp. $1.95.

The authorized edition of Mao Tse-tung's four-volume *Selected Works* ends with 1949, but in recent years—during and since the Cultural Revolution—a great deal of material of widely varying origins has been published in Chinese. These speeches, documents, interviews, etc., are, piece by piece, becoming available to the English-reading public, most conveniently in the above listed books. They constitute some of the most significant material about China to have been published in recent years.

Until the release in China of three major new volumes and several smaller ones, surprisingly few of Mao's speeches since 1949

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had been published. Aside from a few major speeches such as "On Agricultural Cooperation, 1955," and "On Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People, 1957," Mao's post-1949 publicly available writings were fragmentary.*

The circumstances of the release of the new materials which provide the sources for the books under review merit discussion. They were not ordered published by the government or party but they did emerge in the course of extraordinary political conflict. Exactly how is not known, and perhaps the details are different for each volume. In the Cultural Revolution, red guard groups broke into offices and seized files. Some groups obtained sets of tapes, transcriptions, and first- and second-hand notes of speeches, briefings, and discussions of Mao since 1949. This was the road to publication for some of the materials. Alternatively, at least some of the collections may have been informally put together by high-level officials, eager to give younger people a chance to become more familiar with Mao's thought, and wishing to correct unbalanced impressions of Mao emerging from the earlier distributed materials. Moreover, publicizing Mao's views on particular issues and personalities (such as his few uncomplimentary words to his wife Chiang Ch'ing) could be valuable weapons in the course of the Cultural Revolution and subsequent power struggles. Because of the manner in which various materials were released, it must be presumed that they include errors of fact and emphasis, and in many cases the author would have preferred either non-publication or at least an opportunity to edit extensively.

A careful study of the substantive differences in the political thrust of the various sets of materials remains to be done. It is, however, suggestive that one set of materials includes Mao's anarchistic-sounding statement: "The immense complexity of Marxism can be summed up in one sentence: It is justifiable to rebel" (in a 1939 speech celebrating Stalin's sixtieth birthday, *Mao Papers,* p. 17); while in another set of materials, Mao is shown transmuting this slogan to: "It is right to rebel against reactionaries." (Schram, p. 260) Some materials show Mao's praise of Stalin through 1949 (*Mao Papers,* p. 19); others stress Mao's criticism of Stalin. (*Miscellany,* p. 191)

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* These, as well as some of Mao's earlier writings, are conveniently available in *Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1971).

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Through a combination of travelers, secret agents, profiteers, and smugglers, these materials got out of China. Some have been circulated to scholars, and provide some of the sources for the collections edited by Schram and Ch'en. Other collections reached Taiwan, where they were reprinted in Chinese and partially translated into English. (Why Taiwan would reprint Mao's works, apparently without adulteration, is yet another complicated question. Probably the Kuomintang in Taiwan thought publication would demonstrate to potential friends in the United States and elsewhere the strength of their intelligence services and contacts on mainland China. Moreover, they may have thought that the materials would confirm the existence of conflict there. A KMT review of these materials is available in *Issues and Studies* [X:3, December 1973]). This batch of materials has also been used by Schram. Moreover, it has been substantially (but not completely) translated by the Joint Publications Research Service, a division of the U.S. Department of Commerce which specializes in technical translations, under the title *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought,* inexplicably changing the original title *Long Live Mao Tsetung Thought.* Through such a confluence of interests and events do we have new access to Mao's thoughts after 1949.

These new materials are so rich that it is almost premature to review them. They will, undoubtedly, be carefully dissected by political scientists, historians, economists, literary critics, and philosophers. (Psychohistorians will fret: Mao doesn't talk much about his parents or siblings.) Then, perhaps these materials will be supplemented both by more unofficial documents and eventually, it is to be hoped, by an officially edited collection of Mao's post-1949 writings which may clarify some of the ambiguities of the presently available materials and add to them. Draft copies of *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung,* volumes 5 and 6, were reportedly circulated in Peking almost a decade ago, and they are said to have included many articles not in the materials now available. We are, in short, in the midst of a quantum leap in our understanding of the thought and role of Mao.

The Schram collection is the most convenient introduction to these materials. The translation (by John Chinnery and Tieyun) is fluent but perhaps too gentle. Extensive notes help the general reader make sense of Mao's copious references to Chinese literature, history, and recent politics. This volume is especially illuminating on Mao's views on democratic centralism, intra-party struggle, and philosophy and culture. It includes Mao's warnings

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to Lin Piao in 1971, just before the latter's attempted coup. The volume emphasizes somewhat Mao's views on the eves of the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution, but stresses more the political conflict about these movements than Mao's utopian hopes. Schram's introduction is an excellent summary of Mao's thought. Fortunately, this book is available in an inexpensive paperback edition.

The JPRS translation (*Miscellany,* etc.) includes some remarkable material detailing Mao's analysis of Stalin and the general Soviet experience. After Khrushchev denounced Stalin and after the 1956 uprisings in Hungary, Mao's speeches show reservations about imitating the Soviet model of development. Mao clearly wanted to avoid the repression that characterized the Soviet Union. By the early 1960s, in "Reading Notes on the Soviet Union's *Political Economics,*" Mao had developed a systematic critique of Stalin's philosophy, politics, and economic strategy. In *Miscellany,* he appears to be grappling with Stalin's heritage; this is a crucial supplement to the image of Mao emerging from Schram's book. From a chronological point of view, *Miscellany* is particularly strong for the 1955-1957 years and early 1960s when Mao was involved in the Socialist Education Movement, which he considered to be as significant politically as land reform.

People's China is a very useful collection of documents about contemporary China, written by both Chinese and foreign observers. It includes about a dozen pages of the new materials by Mao which are not included in the other books and which show yet another side of Mao. In discussing education with his niece, Wang Hai-jung, now Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mao urges her to rebel against school regulations requiring attendance at Sunday meetings. He encourages her to read widely in traditional Chinese literature and to read the Holy Bible and Buddhist Sutras: How else can she understand China's past and foreigners? *People's China* also includes Mao's scathing attack on bureaucrats and bureaucracy.

Jerome Ch'en's *Mao Papers* features instructions in the midst of the Cultural Revolution and shows Mao the tactician in battle. For these instructions, Ch'en includes an index, and the volume includes an excellent introduction on Mao's literary style. Specialists should appreciate the bibliography of Mao's writings in both English and Chinese, although it seems dated already. *Mao* contains about forty pages of the new materials, most of which are also in Schram's book. It also conveniently collects and ex-

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cerpts from previously available materials, and contains many useful selections of writings about Mao.

These collections of Mao's writings confirm, if it were ever doubted, that Mao is one of the extraordinary political leaders of this century. Throughout, he has a vision of the new society he hopes to build. He would like to reduce social inequality, and reduce the differences between city and countryside, between industrial work and farming, and between mental and physical labor. He hopes that eventually all people will have, free of charge, the food, clothing, shelter they need. He wants to prevent the emergence of a new elite which will capture and control the benefits of economic modernization.

Mao was well aware of the opposition within China to his efforts. In the 1950s he noted that some people comprising the traditional ruling elite of landlords, rich peasants, and urban merchants and manufacturers did not support land reform, collective agriculture, and nationalization of industry. Careful manipulations of class interests served to permit the construction of socialism. Mao explained: "We are making use of the alliance with the bourgeoisie to cope with the peasants' thought of being stingy in selling their grains. We are also utilizing the alliance with the peasants to acquire the grains and industrial raw materials to subjugate the bourgeoisie. We want them to turn out the industrial products and accept remolding." (*Miscellany,* p. 15)

In the early 1960s his fears shifted to the potential for the new leadership to become a ruling class. Outright corruption is a problem. But the more subtle forms of elitism and power worried Mao also. The new bureaucrats eat too well, use government automobiles to go to work, and refuse to do physical labor or tour the countryside.

Hovering behind Mao is the experience of the Soviet Union and Stalin. In the early 1950s he supported the alliance with the Soviet Union, partly as a way of acquiring modern industrial technology. But in 1956 (after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and after uprisings in Hungary and Poland) Mao was quick to point out that China should not copy the bad points of the Soviet Union. Mao boldly states, "Stalin's . . . basic error is his distrust of the people" (*Miscellany,* p. 191), and urges that China allow and be responsive to dissent, that the bureaucracy be decentralized, and that agriculture be given more emphasis compared to heavy industry. Mao particularly criticizes Stalin's exploitation of the

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Soviet Union's peasantry. By the early 1960s he concludes that the Soviet Union has become revisionist, and is no longer a model.

To avoid following in the footsteps of the USSR, Mao repeatedly draws attention to the importance of ideology and political study. The superstructure, including people's beliefs and values, can be molded through conscious political education, and this can shape the basic political pattern. Protest demonstrations are helpful, because they help pinpoint areas of potential problems and help locate unresponsive cadres. Toward corrupt cadres (a serious problem in the early 1960s), Mao shows surprising leniency. They can reform and should be given every opportunity to turn over a new leaf. Corruption is a political, not a legal, problem. So 95 percent of the corrupt officials should be given a chance to return the graft and repent; only 1 or 2 percent should be punished (sometimes severely), as examples. Mao summarized his way of controlling the bureaucracy: "The higher echelons and the basic levels will attack the middle levels on both flanks." (*Miscellany*, pp. 172-173)

One particular concern of Mao is that people should learn through experiences with reality. He constantly warns that book learning has severe limitations, and frequently notes how many people throughout history have been successful at an early age with very little formal education.

In these works Mao appears fairly cautious. He wants cooperative agriculture established, but "what does it matter if it takes a year longer?" (Schram, p. 105) On the eve of the Great Leap Forward, he warns: "We must get rid of the empty reports and foolish boasting." (Schram, p. 106) But he is not completely consistent, saying at the same time that "it is correct to crave greatness and success, to be impatient for quick results, to despise the past and put blind faith in the future." (Schram, p. 121) In June 1958, as the Great Leap was unfolding, Mao is inspired. (Schram, p. 129) But after the Great Leap faltered and a severe economic recession developed, Mao criticizes himself for supporting adventurism and for his poor understanding of economic problems.

Mao's positive and negative comments about the Great Leap leave his precise position ambiguous. Some Pekingologists may claim that this confusion reflects political differences between the compilers of the original sets of Mao's writings; but ambiguity can be found within each set of original materials, so more is involved than a political struggle between editors. Most likely, Mao himself felt torn. He supported the values of the Great Leap and hoped

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it would work; but he also knew that unrealistic adventuristic programs could cause chaos. Generally Mao appears in these works as a patient radical—he never loses sight of his goals but is generally willing to wait for opportune moments and to move forward slowly. At one point he calls himself a "middle-of-the-roader." (Schram, p. 141)

An important element of Mao's style of leadership emerges in these texts. Mao depersonalizes political differences, and raises debate to a historical, philosophical, and class level. Mao uses dialectics and tells his audience that constant struggle between opposites is inevitable, even under socialism. The struggle against Lin Piao, he tells provincial leaders, is not one of personalities, but is one struggle in a long history of struggles within the Party. More will come in the future. The struggle is over ideas of leadership, not over leaders. Mao does not expect everyone to agree with him. He asks only that they move in the correct direction. Rarely specifying policy or making concrete attacks, he suggests that other leaders need to spend more time with peasants and workers, so that they can develop a more realistic, relevant perspective, and so that their decisions can reflect the needs of the majority.

Of course style alone does not explain Mao's continued leadership of the Chinese Revolution for four decades. His broad strategic moves, which are also apparent in these documents, and tactical moves, which sometimes remain obscure, are also important.

In this style of winning people over to his viewpoint, Mao exhibits a remarkable breadth of knowledge. In one paragraph he may refer to several dynasties in Chinese history stretching over thousands of years. In the middle of a report, he digresses to encourage his colleagues to read ancient history or to collect folk poetry. (Schram, p. 123) In one breath, he spans Eastern and Western history, throwing in a bit of botany too: "What are poisonous weeds? [improper thoughts]. . . . Over one hundred years ago, tomatoes were poisonous weeds in Europe. I have also said that many historical personalities like Jesus Christ, Galileo, Copernicus, Martin Luther, and Sun Yat-sen, and Communist parties have been considered by people as poisonous weeds. . . . Chiang Kai-shek . . . was fragrant for a time." (*Miscellany,* p. 207)

Mao's use of Chinese history certainly contains a command to the red guards to familiarize themselves with the past and not to destroy it. Especially in view of the vituperative anti-Confucian

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campaign of 1974-1975, Mao's frequently sympathetic references to Confucius are surprising.

Mao also looks to the natural sciences for examples, especially to explain his dialectical world view. Particle physics, botany, the creation of the universe, and the processes of life and death are used to show that the world is made up of a unity of opposites and is constantly changing. Even the human hand provides Mao with a remarkable example of the value of diversity: "All things are a unity of opposites. Of the five fingers of a hand, four face one direction while the thumb faces another direction. In this way, one can pick up and grasp things. If they all faced in the same direction, they would have been useless." (*Miscellany*, p. 358)

One wishes that other sources were available showing how Mao's associates responded to this style of leadership. Perhaps most of them expected the top leader to be a sage; this was, after all, the traditional expectation of the emperor in China. Perhaps many regional power-holders or top bureaucrats wrote off Mao's philosophizing as the musings of an aging man. These and many other questions remain to be illuminated.

It will be many years before a full picture of Mao and his role in the Chinese Revolution emerges. In the meantime we are fortunate to have these voluminous additions to our understanding of a man who is already clearly recognizable as one of the great architects of the world of the future.

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DEVELOPMENT AND IMPERIALISM

By James Dietz

Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis by Geoffrey Kay. London: Macmillan, 1975. 194 pp.

The underdevelopment of some countries is easily enough recognized—substandard living conditions for the majority, high unemployment, illiteracy, sizable foreign ownership and control of capital, and so on. What is less well understood is the *process* which has resulted in that condition of underdevelopment. In *Development and Underdevelopment,* Geoffrey Kay analyzes the dynamics of this process with an explanation based on Marx's labor theory of value and the historical roles that merchant and industrial capital have played in what are now the developed and underdeveloped nations.

Traditional neoclassical development theorists see no merit in the view that ascribes responsibility for the underdevelopment of some countries to the developed status of others. Rather, development—narrowly identified with a high level of per capita income —is observed to be the natural outcome of a capitalist economic structure, while underdevelopment is believed to result from the existence and dominance of non-capitalist modes of production which continue to exist because of the backward cultural and/or

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traditional characteristics of particular peoples. Armed with these arbitrary classifications, the traditional development theorist comes to the only conclusion possible: capitalism is in fact the source of development, not the cause of underdevelopment. The obvious solution is for the underdeveloped countries to adopt the capitalist mode of production, a process best facilitated by greater cooperation and integration with the already developed capitalist world. This view "parallels the neo-classical assertion that capital does not exploit labor; its moralistic injunction to all countries to work together in their common interest is an extrapolation of the theory of social harmony on to the international scale." (p. 5) Neo-classical developmentalists thus consider underdevelopment to be an "original" condition from which all countries begin and which can be overcome by adopting capitalist methods of production, organization, and, especially, the capitalist value system.

Critics of this view have tried to show the contrary, that capitalism *is* responsible for underdevelopment. They have argued that capitalism in the underdeveloped countries is different from that prevailing in the developed nations. It is *dependent* capitalism, a system linking the underdeveloped areas to the developed in an exploitative network in which the underdeveloped economies serve as sources of cheap raw materials as well as external markets for manufactured goods. From the radical developmentalist's perspective, then, underdevelopment is the outcome of a dependent relation that leaves some countries underdeveloped because others have developed at their expense.

The problem with the dependency theory explanation is that it is difficult to square with traditional Marxist interpretations of the historic role of capitalism. Marx and Engels, for instance, wrote that capitalism would create "a world after its own image." And Kay believes that this apparent contradiction is at least partially responsible for the lack of firm Marxist analysis in the radical development theorists' writings, despite their revolutionary rhetoric. He believes that though it may appear difficult to reconcile capitalist underdevelopment with traditional Marxist views of capitalism, it is not impossible to do so. "On the contrary, the law of value provides the only satisfactory basis for such a theory which is not only adequate to its object, but which is also the definitive critique both scientifically and politically of conventional development theory and its radical offshoots." (p. 12)

Kay argues that, when referring to the exploitation of the underdeveloped countries, the radical development theorists use the term in its emotive, rather than its Marxist, context. For if

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by exploitation they mean what Marx meant when he spoke of the rate of exploitation, their argument abandons Marx's law of value, since it is the highly paid workers of the developed capitalist countries who will be the most exploited (in terms of the ratio of surplus value to the value of paid labor power). The fact that workers in developed countries are paid more does not imply, as Kay shows, less exploitation. Contrariwise, the payment of low wages in underdeveloped nations does not prove that there is a higher rate of exploitation. Kay thus arrives at the (awkwardly put) conclusion that the underdevelopment of some countries is not the result of capitalist exploitation (all workers are exploited under the capitalist mode of production) but "because [capitalism] has not exploited them enough." (p. 55) A high rate of exploitation and surplus-value creation require a high degree of capitalization, something the underdeveloped countries obviously lack. Kay believes that only a consideration of the role that merchant capital has played in these economies can explain underdevelopment.

Merchant capital appears as the earliest form of capital. It is capital (funds) used by a distinct class for the buying and selling of commodities. It develops with the growth of commodity exchange, but precedes the development of capitalism as a particular mode of production. Thus the existence of merchant capital and markets in which goods are exchanged is not sufficient, in itself, to establish the existence of capitalism. Historically, merchant capital established elaborate and extensive trading networks around the world so as to siphon off (via unequal exchange) a portion of the surplus created in the process of commodity production. In its attempt to accumulate more wealth, merchant capital stimulated the growth of commodity production by expanding commodity trade, its only source of profit. Merchant capital thus laid the objective basis for the development of capitalism.

Kay points out, however, that despite this "progressive" feature of merchant capital, it also has a historically conservative nature which leads it to support the non-capitalist class of exploiters upon which its existence depends. In Europe, these contradictory tendencies were resolved only after many years and much violence. The ultimate victor was industrial capital, which eventually subsumed merchant capital, opening the way for the independent development of capitalism. Underdevelopment, Kay argues (p. 95), is due to the continued predominance of merchant capital in those areas, though merchant capital serves only as an appendage of industrial capital in the world economy. This state of affairs has

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persisted until very recently because industrial capital did not consider the underdeveloped world to be much more than a supplier of raw materials and primary commodities and a market for realizing surplus value.

Ultimately, however, in an attempt to maintain profits in the face of worsening terms of trade, merchant capital began to transform itself into industrial capital in the underdeveloped countries. Kay believes it was this changing relation that brought foreign industrial capital into the underdeveloped nations to protect their position, thus ending merchant capital's independent existence. But the prospects for real development are not greatly improved with the introduction of industrial capital and the growth of the transnational corporations. The legacy of years of underdevelopment—the result of the dominance of merchant capital—has left the economies and social structure of these countries crippled and deformed.

Beside the above analysis of underdevelopment, there are other insights scattered throughout the book. Some examples: the briefest resolution of the transformation "problem" I have seen; a concise explanation and critique of Arghiri Emmanuel's theory of unequal exchange; an interpretation of Marx's theory of the increasing immiseration of the proletariat in terms of the rate of exploitation; and so on.

The early chapters provide a clear exposition of Marx's economics, making the book virtually self-contained. It is, however, at times difficult, as the argument is developed at a high level of abstraction. Still, *Development and Underdevelopment* will be useful to all interested in understanding development and imperialism. Hopefully, future research will provide additional evidence for evaluating the validity of Kay's thesis in specific countries.

Merchants have no country. The mere spot they stand on does not constitute so strong an attachment as that from which they draw their gains.

Thomas Jefferson, "Letter to Horatio G. Spafford," March 17, 1814

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(*Continued from inside front cover*)
falling into the trap of prettifying U.S. imperialism, campaign strategists conceived the idea of having Allende invited to speak in the United States under auspices which would be known and respected in Latin America as both North American and anti-imperialist. To explore this possibility, an emissary came to see us in New York, and it turned out to be Orlando Letelier. We assured him that we would be honored to organize a meeting for Allende in New York under the auspices of Monthly Review Associates, and accordingly issued an informal invitation to Dr. Allende through Orlando. Subsequently, however, for reasons we never learned the plan was dropped. Against this background, we were hardly surprised six years later when Orlando was named the Popular Unity government's first Chilean Ambassador to the United States.

In this space in the June issue of MR we called attention to a new publication, *The Radical Teacher: A Newsjournal of Socialist Literary Theory and Practice,* but unfortunately neglected to include the address: c/o Reamy Jensen (editor), 316 West 107th Street, New York, N.Y. 10025.

The situation in India under the increasingly repressive Indira Gandhi dictatorship continues to deteriorate, and accurate information is hard to come by in the countries of the West. Readers will therefore be glad to know about a new publication of the Committee for Freedom in India entitled *India: Democracy or Dictatorship? A Handbook of Facts, Documents, Analysis,* available $1.50 a copy (40 percent off on orders of 10 or more) from World Without War Bookstore, 110 So. Dearborn St., Chicago, Ill. 60603.

News from Neasden. "A Catalogue of New Radical Publications," describes itself as "advertising disguised as bibliography." However that may be, it contains in convenient form much information on new radical publications (books, pamphlets, reprints, etc.) which should be useful to publishers, booksellers, and bookbuyers alike. Rates vary for different categories of subscribers (individuals $3 or 1£). The address is 22 Fleet Road, London NW3 2QS, from which further information can be obtained. Neasden, incidentally, is the home of Book Centre Ltd., which is used by most British hardback publishers for warehousing, delivery, and credit control.

Readers will recall that in this space we have quoted or otherwise referred to letters criticizing MR for being too "academic," "intellectual," "difficult." etc. These criticisms have evoked a variety of responses from others, ranging from agreement with the critics (sometimes accompanied by a subscription cancellation) to one which advises us not to believe the critics, adding: "You have done a good job of making sure the style of the articles chosen for publication is simple. If you make the magazine any simpler, you will probably lose your foreign readership. Remember: the American left is not up to world standards; most readers in this country cannot follow the simplest discussion of theoretical questions." Still, this correspondent agrees with us that authors (no doubt including ourselves) are sometimes guilty of falling into jargon, using fancy words when simpler ones would do as well or better, etc. He ends up, however, with his own criticism: we never tell the guilty ones what to do. "Why not," he asks, "advise them to study a good book on readable writing? Any of Rudolf Flesch's books would do for a start (*The Art of Plain Talk, The Way to Write,* et al.)."

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